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1 
The Privatization Origins of Political Corporations: 
Evidence from the Pinochet Regime 
 
We show that the sale of state owned firms in dictatorships can help political corporations to emerge and 
persist over time. Using new data, we characterize Pinochet’s privatizations in Chile and find that some 
firms were sold underpriced to politically connected buyers. These newly private firms benefited 
financially from the Pinochet regime. Once democracy arrived, they formed connections with the new 
government, financed political campaigns, and were more likely to appear in the Panama Papers. These 
findings reveal how dictatorships can influence young democracies using privatization reforms. 
 
 Firms with political influence are important in today’s democracies (Zingales, 
2017). These political corporations affect policies and increase resource misallocation 
(Faccio, McConnell and Masulis, 2006; Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008; Goldman, 
Rocholl and So, 2013; Colonelli and Prem, 2017, Faccio and Hsu, 2017). Yet how these 
firms emerge and persist over time is currently unknown. We study the case of political 
corporations in Chile and show that these can be traced back in time to the sale of state-
owned firms during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990). In contrast to the idea 
suggested by Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996, 1997), privatizations may politicize 
instead of “depoliticize” firms. 
 The core of our analysis is based on the fact that the sale of state-owned firms is 
plagued by controversies regarding prices and the identity of buyers. In Russia, for 
example, firms were sold underpriced to people who stripped them down and used the 
money to bribe politicians and block reforms (Black, 2000). Similar controversies can be 
found in Argentina, China, India, Mexico, Serbia, Turkey, Uganda, and the U.K.
1
 
Despite their ubiquity, research studying controversial privatizations is scarce.
2
 Finding 
an appropriate context is challenging because we need to observe comparable firms with 
different privatization processes, and measure their behavior over an extended period. 
 Pinochet’s privatizations were also controversial because of prices and the 
identity of buyers (Mönckeberg, 2001). For example, one of the largest mining 
companies in the world was sold underpriced to Pinochet’s son-in-law. Using new data, 
we characterize Pinochet’s privatizations and find that some firms were sold underpriced 
                                                        
1
 There is underpricing in a sale when a firm is sold at lower than its market value. For details about the 
mentioned privatizations see Saba and Manzetti (1997), Celarier (1997), Baran (2000), Tangri and Mwenda 
(2001), Green and Haskel (2004), Milovanović (2007), Fisman and Wang (2014). 
2
 An exception is Fisman and Wang (2014), which studies corruption in Chinese privatizations. The 
original literature emphasizes how the state obtains revenues from selling state owned assets and firms 
experience economic changes and increased productivity (Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer and Tsukanova, 1996; 
La Porta and López-de-Silanes, 1999; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Frydman, Gray, Hessel and 
Rapaczynski, 1999). Megginson and Netter (2001) and Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar (2009) 
provide excellent surveys of the literature. 
 
2 
to politically connected buyers. We then compare similar firms that were privatized 
differently and find that those sold to connected buyers benefited financially from 
Pinochet. Once democracy arrived, they formed connections with the new government, 
financed political campaigns, and were more likely to appear in the Panama Papers. 
These findings reveal how dictatorships can influence young democracies and document 
how privatization reforms may help political corporations to persist over time. 
 We begin the analysis by constructing several datasets. Listed firms were required 
to annually report their activities to a regulatory agency. We digitize these reports 
including balance sheets, income statements, debt with banks, and the names of owners 
and board members. These are the largest firms in Chile. Then, using the names of firms 
privatized by Pinochet, we identify those with annual reports. To characterize their 
privatization, we collect data on buyers and sale prices. Finally, we use the names of 
owners, board members, and politicians, to detect connections to the new democratic 
governments (1990-), to identify firms engaged in campaign finance, and to measure tax 
avoidance revealed by the Panama Papers. 
 We classify firms into types of privatizations using a data-driven algorithm. Using 
book values, balance sheets, and the identity of buyers and board members before 
privatization, we construct relative measures of underpricing and closeness to Pinochet. 
The former reveals differences in sale prices. The latter shows different people involved 
in the sales, from those closely connected to Pinochet to those without relationship. These 
variables allow us to employ a clustering algorithm to detect two groups of firms. When 
comparing these, we find a group of firms sold underpriced using people close to 
Pinochet, i.e. “controversial privatizations.”3 We crosscheck the classification delivered 
by the algorithm using the names of firms mentioned in two well-known investigations 
(Marcel, 1989; Mönckeberg, 2001). 
 After constructing the data, we compare firms with controversial privatizations to 
other privatized firms before they were sold. The two types of firms had similar 
indebtedness and performance. This similarity suggests that controversies were unrelated 
to firm behavior and industry dynamics. There are, however, differences in firm size for 
which we control. The day after the 1988 referendum, which ended the Pinochet regime,  
firms with controversial privatizations experienced an eight-percentage points decrease in 
abnormal stock returns. This result is consistent with controversial firms obtaining 
benefits from Pinochet (Fisman, 2001). 
 Motivated by the reaction of investors, we study the evolution of economic and 
political outcomes by comparing controversial and otherwise similar uncontroversial 
privatizations within industries. First, we focus on the short-run after privatization and 
study debt financing between privatized firms and state owned banks, since previous 
                                                        
3
 Examples of articles using clustering algorithms include Brocas, Carrillo, Wang and Camerer (2014), 
which classifies subjects using their choices, and Crone (2005), which constructs alternative regions in the 
U.S. 
 
3 
research has shown companies may use these institutions to extract rents.
4
 Second, we 
study the political behavior of firms after Pinochet left power (1990-2005) by analyzing 
the relationship between controversial firms, political connections, campaign finance, and 
tax avoidance. 
 Our analysis reveals that firms with controversial privatizations acquired more 
loans from state-owned banks towards the end of the regime (1988-1990). In contrast, we 
do not observe these differential interactions between controversial firms and other types 
of banks. This result is consistent with our stock market findings and constitutes 
additional evidence suggesting these firms were benefitting from the regime. Our 
econometric strategy uses the unexpected outcome of the 1988 referendum and an 
analysis of loans from the main state bank, private banks, and international banks before 
and after the referendum. In addition, controversial firms grew faster than other 
privatized firms in the same industry during the dictatorship. 
 Next, we show that firms with controversial privatizations formed connections 
with the new governments, financed political campaigns, and were more likely to appear 
in the Panama Papers. Controversial firms employed politicians 25 percentage points 
more often and substituted connections from the old to the new democratic regime after 
democratization: in 2005 controversial firms employed 40 percentage points more 
politicians of the new government. This finding is important because political 
connections increase resource misallocation (Cingano and Pinotti, 2013) and produce 
rents for connected individuals (Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rose, 2012). Finally, 
controversial firms were 31 percentage points more likely to engage in campaign finance 
and 36 percentage points more likely to appear in the Panama Papers. 
 Our findings are robust and driven by the connections of buyers. Results are 
robust to different classification methods, estimation techniques, additional control 
variables, and robust to account for the effect of unobservable variables using coefficient 
stability methods (Altonji, Elder and Taber, 2005; Oster, 2019). In addition, results are 
explained by the political connections of the buyers of firms. In contrast, the pre-
privatization connection of firms is empirically unrelated to the financial benefits during 
the dictatorship and the political behavior in democracy. However, given that we cannot 
fully discard the presence of unobserved characteristics driving both controversies and 
political behaviors, we cannot distinguish between privatization reforms creating or 
facilitating the persistence of political corporations. 
 The main contribution of this paper is to show how privatization reforms can help 
political corporations to emerge and persist over time. Previous research has shown that 
corrupt privatizations have a negative effect on firm performance (Fisman and Wang, 
2014), political reasons are usually behind the origins of these reforms (Boycko, Shleifer 
                                                        
4
 Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that politically connected firms in Pakistan used government banks to 
extract rents. See also Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002), Sapienza (2004), Lucca, Seru and Trebbi 
(2014), and González and Prem (2019). 
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and Vishny, 1994; López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and privatizations 
might be used to gain political support (Bel, 2010). However, there is little empirical 
work outside of these contributions and the role of firms as vehicles to preserve economic 
and political power has been relatively overlooked. We add to this literature showing how 
firms sold to politically connected buyers may extract rents from the state using the credit 
market and avoiding taxes, and may attempt to influence politics by forming new 
connections and engaging in campaign finance. 
 This paper also constitutes an example of how authoritarian regimes can affect the 
functioning of young democracies, namely using policies to take control of firms and 
transmit their economic and political power. Why and how authoritarian regimes affect 
democracies is a long-standing theoretical question in the social sciences (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Acemoglu, 
Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010). But only recently scholars have been able to empirically 
document the legacies of non-democracies. Previous research emphasizes the importance 
of local politicians inherited from a dictatorship (Martínez Bravo, 2014; Martínez Bravo, 
Mukherjee and Stegmann, 2017), and the role of elites during transition (Albertus and 
Menaldo, 2014, 2018).  Similar legacies could arise from corrupt democracies. 
 This paper also contributes to the literature studying political corporations 
(Zingales, 2017), the persistence of elites (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008), and the 
“revolving door” in politics (Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rose, 2012). As emphasized 
by Zingales (2017, p. 113), large firms are important political actors throughout the world 
but “the commonly prevailing view of the firm ignores all elements of politics and 
power.” We contribute to this literature by showing the origins of political corporations. 
In doing so, our analysis constitutes an example of the dictatorial origins of elites 
attempting to capture a democracy (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Wantchekon, 2000; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2011). Our results 
emphasize the importance of the “revolving door” to explain elite persistence and provide 
one policy-related mechanism behind the “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels, 1915).  
 Finally, our work sheds light on mechanisms that businesspeople linked to 
authoritarian regimes may use to extract rents. Earlier theoretical work has emphasized 
that rent extraction might foster stable political coalitions (Brough and Kimenyi, 1986). 
Recent empirical work has shown how rent extraction is exacerbated in authoritarian 
regimes (Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria and Padró-i-
Miquel, 2015). More closely related, Atanasov (2005) shows that as much as 85% of firm 
value was extracted during Bulgaria’s mass privatization in the 1990s. We contribute to 
this literature by showing evidence of rent extraction using state-owned banks, political 
connections, electoral campaigns, and tax avoidance. Our analysis highlights how market 
and institutional structures can influence firm behavior by affecting the marginal returns 
and costs of lobbying in new democracies. Dictatorships create economic rents to be 
protected and political connections lower the costs of exerting influence. 
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THE PRIVATIZATIONS OF THE PINOCHET REGIME 
 
 Augusto Pinochet led a dictatorship from the 1973 coup d’état against President 
Salvador Allende until March 1990; 17 months after citizens rejected his continuation in 
office in a referendum known as the “1988 plebiscite” (October 5, 1988). Following an 
agreement between the regime and the opposition, a presidential election with candidates 
from all parties was held in December 1989. The opposition won and Chile returned to 
democracy. Despite contentious debates about Pinochet’s legacies, there is little evidence 
testing the persistent effects of his policies.
5
 
 The economic policies implemented by Pinochet aimed to decrease government 
spending, control inflation, decrease trade tariffs, and sell state owned firms. A group of 
economists - known as the “Chicago Boys” - designed and implemented these policies 
and their effects are now a source of controversy among supporters and critics of the 
regime. Supporters argue that the macroeconomic stability and high growth rates in the 
1990s were a direct consequence of the regime's policies. Critics point to corruption 
during the Pinochet years and the currently high level of inequality. One of the most 
important controversies lies around privatizations. 
 The privatization process had several objectives. First, the regime was influenced 
by economists who believed in the efficiency of private property, a popular sentiment 
among right-wing parties after the economic instability during Allende’s government 
(1970-1973). One of the regime’s goals was to privatize firms previously nationalized by 
Allende. There were also political reasons, to unite businesspeople behind the 
government, particularly after the 1982 economic crisis, and to gain their support before 
the 1988 plebiscite.
6
 There is limited evidence suggesting that privatizations were used as 
a financing tool. 
 Mass privatizations are difficult to implement. To gain popular support, the 
regime used Margaret Thatcher’s framing of “popular capitalism” and justified the 
process as a “diffusion of property to make Chile a country of owners” (Huneeus, 2006, 
                                                        
5
 Huneeus (2006) provides a detailed analysis of the Pinochet regime, and Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda 
(2011) provide detailed accounts of important events. According to data collected by Treisman (2017), 
Chile’s democratization is a common one: elections have ended almost half of dictatorships in the last two-
hundred years. 
6
 Huneeus (2006, ch. 9) provides a nice summary of the privatization process. Other accounts include 
Hachette and Lüders (1992) and Hachette (2001). Bel (2010) shows a similar political use of privatizations 
in Nazi Germany. 
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p. 314).
7
 The regime sold firms in two rounds. The first came in the second half of the 
1970s, was organized by the Production Development Corporation, and aimed at re-
privatizing companies expropriated by Allende. The second round used the “popular 
capitalism” strategy and began after the 1982 economic crisis, when the state gained 
control of several firms. Figure 1-A plots the number of privatizations per year, where 
these two waves are visible. 
 There is limited information about the implementation of privatizations. A 
commission called by the Congress after the return to democracy produced the most 
detailed account (Congress Report, 2004). The second chapter highlights three key 
characteristics. First, information about firms being sold and their sale prices was scarce, 
debilitating the quality of the process. Second, firms were sold using different methods, 
and the explanation for the method chosen is mostly unclear. Some firms were sold using 
public auctions, prequalifying interested buyers, negotiating prices, and allowing buyers 
to use credit. But data on interested buyers, prequalifications, and bids is unfortunately 
missing. When the number of buyers was expected to be low the firm was sold using a 
direct sale (Hachette and Lüders, 1992). Packages of shares were also sold gradually in 
the stock market “to avoid concentration of economic power and unjustified subsidies” 
(Marcel, 1989, p. 31). And third, the legal framework to regulate the process allowed the 
sales to unfold the way they did: almost everybody was legally able to buy shares and the 
procedure was loose enough for people to negotiate the price and the method of payment. 
 Although Pinochet’s privatizations are perceived as relatively successful (Galal, 
1994), some sales have generated controversies, permeating the debate about Pinochet’s 
legacies. Given the amount of assets sold—approximately US $3.6 billion according to 
Meller (1998, p. 268)—the controversy is understandable. On one hand, critics argue that 
some privatizations were used to transfer resources from the state to a handful of buyers 
who were close to Pinochet. On the other hand, supporters argue that privatizations 
increased firm performance and benefited the economy. We gather the most 
comprehensive firm-level data to shed light on this debate. 
 
 
DATA CONSTRUCTION 
 
 We use annual firm-level data digitized from administrative documents kept by 
Chile’s regulatory agency Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, an independent 
institution equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. By law, all 
firms listed in the Chilean stock market have to submit yearly reports. These firms are 
among the largest in the country. 
                                                        
7
 The Ministry of Economics stated, “Private property is one of the pillars of a free society and one of the 
keys to success of advanced Western societies. For the right to property to really be effective, it must come 
with extensive, massive and indiscriminate access to property” (Estrategia, May 12-18, 1986). 
 
7 
 The reports reveal balance sheets, income statements, debts, and the names of 
board members and owners. The information was standardized in 1985, and thus firms 
have reported the same variables since then. Before that year, however, firms reported 
balance sheets, income statements, and other scattered information. We digitize the 
reports and standardize the monetary information to 1998 Chilean pesos using the 
consumer price index of the Central Bank. The Online Appendix presents an example of 
a report. All reports were audited and have been used by well-known investigations of the 
period.
8
 
 Next, we match the reports with the 387 firms privatized by Pinochet (Congress 
Report, 2004).
9
 We found 50 firms in our data and the list of privatized firms. The 
remaining 337 firms were small, unlisted private companies with only a few 
shareholders. These firms were not mandated to submit reports and their information 
remains undisclosed. Among the 50 firms with reports we find popular companies sold 
underpriced to buyers connected to Pinochet. For example, the dataset includes the 
Chemical and Mining Society of Chile, sold to Pinochet’s son-in-law and recently 
involved in corruption scandals; and the National Electricity Company, sold to a former 
dictatorship collaborator. The data also includes companies mentioned by Marcel (1989) 
and Mönckeberg (2001), the latter a best selling book studying Pinochet’s privatizations. 
Although data limitations prevent us from a thorough comparison of firms with and 
without reports, we know the latter were privatized on average three years earlier and the 
former were presumably larger and relatively more important in the economic history of 
the country. 
 
Controversial privatizations 
 
 We classify firms into types of privatizations using a k-means cluster analysis 
with two variables that characterize the privatization process of a firm. First, we collect 
information about the people involved in the sale and construct a measure of “social 
distance” to the Pinochet regime. Second, we use multiple historical sources to recover 
sale prices and construct a measure of underpricing that can be compared across firms. 
We say a privatization was “controversial” if a firm was sold relatively underpriced and 
the transaction involved people connected to Pinochet. 
                                                        
8
 Examples of journalistic investigations using anecdotal data from the reports include Mönckeberg (2001), 
Tromben (2016), and Guzmán (2017), among others. To the best of our knowledge the only papers using 
1980s reports in an econometric framework are González and Prem (2018a,b, 2019), who study the role of 
political connections in Chile’s democratization. Academic articles using post 1990s reports include 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) and Martínez, Stöhr and Quiroga (2007). 
9
 There were 725 firms privatized by Pinochet, but 338 of these were being nationalized and the regime re-
privatized them immediately after the 1973 coup. 
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 The first variable is the social distance between people involved in the sale and 
Pinochet. To construct it, we proceed in two steps. In the first step, we identify the buyers 
and study their relation to the regime. We classify a buyer as linked to the regime if they 
had worked for the regime before the privatization. Similarly, in the second step we use 
the names of board members, study their job history prior to the privatization, and 
identify those who had previously worked for the regime. The Online Appendix provides 
details about this procedure. Table 1 presents summary statistics. Overall 8% of board 
members and 42% of buyers had worked for Pinochet. Then we combine both measures 
linearly to create a one-dimensional metric of “closeness to the Pinochet regime.” 
 The second variable measures the extent of underpricing. There are unfortunately 
no records of auctions, participants, and bids in these sales. Therefore, to construct it we 
compare the price per share paid in the privatization with the book value per share, which 
we obtained by dividing the book value of equity in the year before the privatization over 
the number of shares available, ensuring all prices are in comparable currencies and 
taking inflation values into account. For companies that were returned to their previous 
owners without payment, and for bankrupt companies, we assume that the price per share 
and book value per share coincide. Thus our underpricing variable is the ratio between 
the difference in book value and privatization price per share over the book value per 
share. Hence, higher positive values indicate more underpricing. This measure allows us 
to compare prices across privatizations. Again, Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. 
 To provide some validation for the underpricing variable, we constructed two 
alternative measures. The first one combines the prices paid by buyers with the present 
value of future cash flows. To estimate future cash flows we use the pre-privatization 
ones, available only for a subset of firms. The second measure combines the same prices 
with estimates of firm value, available for a small number of firms. These estimates were 
calculated by contemporaneous consulting companies or by other researchers. The Online 
Appendix provides more details. Reassuringly, our underpricing variable is positive 
correlated with both of these alternative measures (p-values of 0.09 and <0.01 
respectively). We interpret these correlations as providing some validity for the 
underpricing variable we use throughout the analysis. 
 The last step employs a k-means clustering algorithm (Steinhaus, 1957) using 
underpricing and closeness-to-the-regime as inputs. This algorithm is an unsupervised 
learning approach that classifies firms in groups. We choose it due to its simplicity and 
wide use in empirical research. Figure 2-A presents results. The y-axis measures relative 
underpricing and the x-axis the closeness-to-the-regime. As can be seen, and confirmed 
statistically in Table 1, there is a group of firms sold underpriced and those involved in 
the sale had close ties to the regime.
10
 The algorithm finds 22 firms that had, under our 
                                                        
10
 Figures 2-B and 2-C show that this classification is robust to the use of other algorithms. We also detect 
similar groups when we use multi-clustering techniques. We use two groups for simplicity; techniques to 
estimate the number of clusters (Tibshirani, Walther and Hastie, 2001) deliver non-robust numbers. 
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definition, controversial privatization processes. Marcel (1989) and Mönckeberg (2001) 
classified all these controversial privatizations as “corrupt” due to underpricing, which 
serves as a partial check to the approach. 
 
Politics in democracy 
 
To study how privatized firms evolved, we first analyze firm-level economic outcomes. 
We then look at three dimensions that can be affected by firms: the dynamic formation of 
political connections, campaign finance, and tax avoidance (Fisman, 2001; Claessens, 
Feijen and Laeven, 2008; Zucman, 2013). 
 We construct datasets that measure: (i) which firms formed political connections, 
(ii) which firms contributed to political campaigns, and (iii) which board members 
appeared in the Panama Papers. The first uncovers the employment of politicians as 
board members. We collect the names of all people working as Ministers and similar 
high-level positions during the Pinochet dictatorship, calling them “politicians of the old 
regime.” We also gather the names of all Ministers and similar high-level positions of La 
Concertación, coalition in power in the 1990s, calling them “politicians of the new 
regime.” Then we gather the names of all board members in our data and identify 
politicians using a probabilistic record-matching algorithm.
11
 Using this approach, we 
create an indicator for firms with connections to the old and new regimes.  
We also use recently declassified documents with the names of firms contributing 
to political campaigns and avoiding taxes using tax havens. We observe legal and illegal 
campaign contributions separately. The latter is a list of firms that illegally financed 
political campaigns in the 2013 presidential election. The Chilean tax authority made it 
public in 2014.
12
 The list reveals, for example, that SQM - firm with a controversial 
privatization - transferred resources to candidates before the election. Overall, 37% and 
19% of firms in our data financed political campaigns legally and illegally respectively. 
For comparison, less than 1% of privatized firms outside of our data contributed to 
campaigns legally and none contributed illegally.  
 To measure tax avoidance, we match the list of board members in democracy with 
the list of people who appeared in the Panama Papers using the same probabilistic record-
                                                        
11
 The algorithm produces a similarity index with support at the unit interval. We checked case by case 
among high index values and defined a match if: (i) there was an obvious misspelling, (ii) there was a 
missing name but the two last names were the same and in correct order, or (iii) there was a missing last 
name but the individual had the same two names in correct order. We identified 30 board members as 
former politicians. 
12
 The illegality of these contributions arises because firms “hired” candidates for services that were never 
provided, a transfer of money that allowed firms to pay fewer taxes. Data on illegal financing of political 
campaigns is unfortunately only available for the 2013 presidential election. 
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matching algorithm. We found 13 board members who worked in 15 firms, 10 of which 
were controversial. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 This section presents five findings. First, there were few differences across firms 
with and without controversies before their privatization. Second, the stock market value 
of firms with controversies decreased temporarily after the announcement of the 
transition from dictatorship to democracy. Third, firms with controversies obtained more 
loans from state banks before the transition. Fourth, firms with controversial 
privatizations grew at a higher rate during the dictatorship.  Five, controversial firms 
formed political connections with the new regime, engaged in campaign finance, and 
their boards were more likely to appear in the Panama Papers. 
 
Before and during privatization 
 
 How different were firms before privatization? To answer this question, we use 
the reports before the privatization year of each firm. To gain statistical accuracy about 
firms’ fundamentals, we take three-year averages of the logarithm of assets, logarithm of 
sales, return over equity, and leverage. We choose these variables because they were 
available for all firms. In addition, we constructed the changes in these variables by 
taking the difference between year one and three before privatization to study pre-trends, 
we constructed Tobin’s q, and we collected the dates when firms were established. We 
compare these 10 variables and the privatization year. 
 Table 2 compares firms. In addition to firms in our data, we include two other 
groups: firms without privatization but with reports, and firms with privatization but 
without reports. For the former group we present summary statistics before the average 
privatization year in the firm’s industry, but the patterns are similar if we use nearby 
years. For the latter group there is unfortunately little information and, therefore, we can 
only observe their privatization year and industry. The Online Appendix presents the 
distribution of firms by industry in our data and for all privatizations, where we see that 
our data over-represent the manufacturing industry and under-represent the wholesale and 
retail trade industry, but other industries (e.g. electricity and mining) are well represented. 
 Each row in Table 2 presents the average and standard deviation of one of 11 
variables. Columns 1 and 2 examine controversial and uncontroversial privatizations 
separately. Column 3 presents p-values for differences in means across groups, with and 
 
11 
without correction for small sample inference.
13
 Column 4 uses the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test to compare the distribution of variables across groups (Kolmogorov, 1933; 
Smirnov, 1933). Columns 1-4 show few statistically significant differences in 
profitability, growth prospects as measured by Tobin’s q and asset growth, indebtedness, 
or firm age before privatization. The exception is firm size; we observe controversial 
firms were on average smaller. Although our ability to detect differences across firms 
may be affected by the sample size, the majority of differences are also of relatively small 
economic magnitude.
14
 When compared to firms in our data, column 5 reveals that firms 
privatized by the regime were significantly larger, older, and had lower performance, but 
had similar debt compared to other firms with reports but not privatized. 
 To improve our understanding of privatization characteristics Table 3 presents 
different regression specifications using underpricing (columns 1-4) and closeness-to-the-
regime (columns 5-7) as separate dependent variables, and pre-privatization variables and 
industry fixed effects as predictors. All in all, we observe that firms sold in the 1980s 
exhibited significantly more underpricing (p-value<0.05) and the underpricing was larger 
when the buyers were close to the regime (p-value<0.10). In contrast, the importance of 
pre-privatization variables is economically smaller. These results suggest that there might 
be a relationship between both privatization characteristics that we discuss below. 
 In sum, we interpret Tables 2 and 3 as evidence that, although the privatization 
decision may have been driven by firm dynamics, the type of privatization - i.e. 
controversial versus uncontroversial - seems not to have been driven by firms’ behavior. 
In what follows we present several econometric exercises supporting this interpretation. 
 
The stock market 
 
 We use the framework of Fisman (2001) to test whether firms with controversial 
processes benefited financially from Pinochet. We study the stock market value of 
controversial firms after an exogenous shock that increased the probability of political 
transition.
15
 If controversial firms benefited from the dictatorship, we expect to see a 
decrease in their value after the unexpected outcome of the referendum that ended the 
dictatorship. This referendum was held on October 5 of 1988 and had Pinochet running to 
                                                        
13
 See Robinson and Robinson (2001) for details about permutation tests and Rossi (2014) for an 
application. We calculate p-values using Monte Carlo simulations with 1,000 random permutations. 
14
 These differences are similar when we use within-industry comparisons. The Online Appendix presents 
industries by privatization type, shows the similarity across firms within the first and second waves of 
privatizations, and further confirms that there are few differences across firms using the subsample 
privatized in the 1980s, where we observe more variables due to report standardization (see data section). 
15
 Fisman (2001) used health shocks suffered by Indonesia’s dictator. Subsequent papers have used 
unexpected electoral outcomes (e.g. Ferguson and Voth 2008; Dube, Kaplan and Naidu 2011; Fisman, 
Fisman, Galef, Khurana and Wang (2012); Luechinger and Moser 2014). 
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remain in office for the next eight years (with yes or no votes). The regime wanted to 
validate themselves as democratic in front of the international community. Both the 
rejection of Pinochet’s continuation and the regime’s acknowledgement of results were 
unexpected.
16
 
 To measure changes in the stock market, we digitize daily stock prices of listed 
firms from newspaper El Mercurio, available at Chile’s National Library. We restrict 
attention to firms that were traded for at least four months before the plebiscite to analyze 
abnormal returns (that is. the difference between returns and expected returns):  
 
ARit = Rit – (ai + bi Rmt)   (1) 
 
where Rit is the stock return of firm i on day t, Rmt is the market return on day t, and we 
estimate the parameters ai, bi using pre-plebiscite data. As for robustness, we also looked 
at cumulative abnormal returns, defined as Σt=0
t=j
 ARit (see Campbell et al. 1997 for 
details). The usage of pre-plebiscite data leaves us with 41 firms, 20 of which were 
controversial. We present estimates of the following regression graphically: 
 
CARijt = bt Controversiali + dt Xi + njt + eijt   (2) 
 
where CARijt=Σk=0
t
 ARik is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i, which operates in 
industry j, from the day of the plebiscite up to t days; Controversiali is an indicator for 
controversial firms; Xi represent pre-privatization controls (i.e., assets, sales, return over 
equity, and leverage); njt is a set of industry fixed effects, and eijt is a mean zero error 
term. The parameter of interest is bt and measures the differential cumulative abnormal 
return for firms with controversial privatizations. All parameters in equation (2) are 
indexed by t because we estimate it separately for t=1,3,5,8,10. 
 Figure 3-A presents daily abnormal returns by type of privatization, and Table 4 
the corresponding regression estimates. Consistent with our hypothesis we find a 
statistically significant decrease in abnormal returns among controversial firms the day 
after the plebiscite. The drop in abnormal returns corresponds to approximately 7.5 
percentage points (Table 4-A, column 1, p-value<0.01), it lasts for at least ten days, and it 
is robust to the inclusion of pre-privatization controls. Moreover, these results are similar 
                                                        
16
 González and Prem (2018a, 2019) provide details about the plebiscite, show the unexpectedness of the 
outcome by studying stock prices and show how televised political campaigns influenced electoral results. 
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when accounting for a potential non-normality in the distribution of abnormal returns and 
the cross-sectional correlation between stocks in the day of the event (Kolari and 
Pynnönen, 2010). When compared to prominent estimates in the literature, we calculate 
that this drop in returns is larger than the one in Fisman (2001) and similar to those in 
Ferguson and Voth (2008) and Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, Kwak and Mitton (2013). 
Figures 3-B through 3-E show that these patterns are particular to the 
announcement of the transition. We observe similar abnormal returns around other 
important political events, namely the day when Pinochet was nominated to be on the 
ballot at the plebiscite (August 30, 1988), the last constitutional reform in dictatorship 
(July 30, 1989), the 1989 presidential election (December 14, 1989), and when the new 
government took office (March 3, 1990). As highlighted in prior literature, the behavior 
of Chilean investors is also consistent with controversial firms having disproportionately 
benefitted from their connections to Pinochet’s regime. 
 
The credit market under dictatorship 
 
 The credit market can reveal whether firms with and without controversial 
privatizations were receiving a differential treatment from the regime. To study this 
market, we use information about firms’ outstanding debt with Banco del Estado (Bank 
of the State, the only state owned bank in the country) and other types of banks.
17
 We 
study firm debt financing with these banks in the period between October 1988 and 
March 1990. In particular, we estimate the following regression before and after the 
plebiscite: 
 
Yijt
k
 = bt
k
 Controversialij + dt
k
 Xij + njt
k
 + eijt
k
   (3) 
 
where i indexes firms, j industries, t periods, and k the type of bank (i.e., state-owned, 
private, or international). The dependent variable Yijt
k
 is an indicator for firms with 
outstanding debt with bank k in period t, the average interest rate with this bank, leverage, 
or the logarithm of total debt. We study two periods, before and after the plebiscite, i.e. 
1986-1987 and 1988-1990. All regressions include pre-privatization controls Xij (i.e., 
assets, sales, return over equity, and leverage) and industry fixed effects by period, njt. 
The coefficients of interest bt
k
 measure the within-industry differences among 
controversial privatizations in the outcome of interest while controlling for pre-
                                                        
17
 Anecdotally, León-Dermota (2002) argues that between October 1988 and March 1990, Banco del 
Estado lost a significant amount of wealth because of dubious financial operations. The president of this 
bank during this period was a “Chicago Boy” appointed directly by Pinochet in November 1988. 
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privatization differences. Note that we allow coefficients to differ by period and bank 
type. 
 Table 5-A presents estimates of equation (3) after the plebiscite. Column 1 shows 
that controversial privatizations were 30 percentage points more likely to have loans from 
Banco del Estado between 1988 and 1990 (p-value<0.05), when it was known Pinochet 
would be leaving. This result is consistent with the findings in Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
and suggests that the dictatorship used the credit market to benefit these firms; and it is 
also consistent with the evidence in González and Prem (2019), which finds that firms in 
the Pinochet’s social network obtained more loans from state owned banks between 1988 
and 1990. Column 4 shows that these loans had 4 percentage points lower interest rates, 
but this estimate relies on a smaller sample and it is only statistically significant when 
using small sample inference. In contrast, we do not observe any of these patterns 
between controversial firms and private or international banks and point estimates are of 
significantly smaller economic relevance (see columns 2, 3, 5, and 6). Finally, column 7 
shows that there are no statistically significant differences in leverage between 
privatizations, which suggest firms either substituted loans across banks or increased their 
equity in this period, and column 8 shows that controversial firms had more total debt. 
 Although the reader might be concerned that controversial privatizations were 
potentially different in unobservable dimensions, and this is the reason why we observe a 
different credit market for these firms, the evidence suggests this was probably not the 
case. Table 5-B presents estimates of equation (3) using reports before the plebiscite and 
we do not find statistically significant differences in state loans or interest rates. 
Moreover, most point estimates are economically smaller than in panel A and patterns 
with other banks are again similar across types of firms. Interactions between 
controversial firms and the state bank seem to have changed over time, but we can only 
reject the similarity of coefficients in column 1 of panels A and B with a p-value of 0.11 
when we use a pooled panel specification. Point estimates also suggest total debt 
increased in 1988-90, but we cannot reject that it remained similar. Because of this and 
other concerns below we discuss additional robustness checks. 
 
The beginning of democracy 
 
 Controversial privatizations differed significantly at the very beginning of 
democracy. We consider a version of equation (3) with time-invariant coefficients and 
measuring the dependent variable in 1990. To be consistent, we consider the same four 
firm-level outcomes (assets, sales, return over equity, and leverage) and also stock returns 
since the year of privatization. Note that we again control for pre-privatization variables 
and include industry fixed effects in our estimation. 
 Table 6 presents results. Columns 1 and 2 show that controversial firms grew 
faster than other firms in the same industry during the dictatorship. Given that we are 
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controlling for previous size and these firms were smaller, this result means that 
controversial firms partially caught up in terms of size. Results using the logarithm of 
sales as dependent variable confirm this faster growth, although the point estimate is not 
statistically significant. In contrast, columns 3 and 4 show that there was little difference 
in indebtedness levels (i.e. leverage) and profitability (i.e. return over equity). Finally, 
column 5 shows that stock returns since the year of privatization were statistically similar 
between controversial and uncontroversial firms, although the point estimate suggests 
that the stock returns of controversial firms were lower. 
 Overall, results reveal that firms with controversial privatizations grew 
significantly more in dictatorship but experienced little improvement in their profitability. 
 
Politics in democracy 
 
 Are controversial firms influencing politics in democracy? We focus on three 
sources of distortions: the employment of politicians, the financing of political 
campaigns, and tax avoidance. We begin by studying employment of politicians as board 
members, empirically associated with rent extraction (e.g., Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 
Goldman et al. 2013) and thus an important source of misallocation (e.g. Cingano and 
Pinotti, 2013). Because misallocation affects total factor productivity (Hsieh and Klenow, 
2009), understanding the formation of these connections is critical. 
 We study the evolution of political connections in a dynamic fashion. We 
estimate equation (3) using as the dependent variable an indicator for firms that employed 
at least one politician for their board. To capture dynamics, we measure this employment 
in different points in time and use three types of politicians: (i) former politicians of the 
Pinochet regime who enjoyed significant political power at the beginning of democracy 
and who we call “politicians of the old regime”; (ii) politicians of the new democratic 
incumbent coalition opposed to Pinochet called Concertación, who we call “politicians of 
the new regime”; and (iii) any of the previous politicians, who we call “any politician.”  
 Table 7 shows that controversial firms were 25 percentage points more likely to 
employ any politician after the dictatorship, 25 percentage points more likely to employ a 
politician from the Pinochet regime at the beginning of democracy, and 40 percentage 
points more likely to employ politicians of the new regime after 15 years of democracy. 
These coefficients represent economically large magnitudes and the dynamics are 
revealing. Controversial firms substituted connections from the old to the new regime 
after a decade in democracy. These connections reverted almost perfectly and in 2005 we 
observe more than half of controversial firms in our data having connections to the new 
democratic coalition. In contrast, politicians of the old regime were no longer in these 
firms by 2005. 
 Controversial firms may also distort the political arena via financing political 
campaigns. This is the case studied in Claessens, Feijen and Laeven (2008), which shows 
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that Brazilian firms that contributed to political campaigns had higher stock returns 
because they benefited from preferential access to bank financing. In addition, political 
contributions have also been found to affect public procurement (Baltrunaite, 2019). 
Although perhaps intuitive, this type of analysis has been relatively scarce because data 
on campaign contributions can be difficult to obtain. 
 The list of firms that illegally financed political campaigns was revealed after an 
extensive investigation by the Chilean tax authority. Accusations of illegal campaign 
financing before the presidential election of 2013 were the motivation behind that 
investigation. The illegality of these transfers took the form of monetary payments from 
firms to politicians for “services” that were never delivered. These interactions were 
summarized, and the list of firms participating was publicized in the press. We also 
observe the list of firms that contributed to campaigns legally between 2005 and 2013. 
We construct two indicator variables, one for illegal and another one for legal campaign 
finance. We observe that 46% of firms in our data legally contributed to political 
campaigns in the period between 2005 and 2013, and 22% contributed illegally in 2013. 
 We follow the same econometric strategy and estimate equation (3) using an 
indicator for legal or illegal campaign finance as the dependent variable. The last rows in 
Table 7 present results. Estimated coefficients show that controversial privatizations were 
31 percentage points more likely to legally finance political campaigns (p-value<0.05) 
and 19 percentage points more likely to contribute illegally, although the latter result is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value 0.19). These differences are 
economically meaningful. On one hand, only 37 and 19% of uncontroversial 
privatizations contributed legally and illegally (see column 3). On the other hand, more 
than 68 and 37% of controversial privatizations did. These results suggest that 
controversial firms indeed seem to have attempted to exert influence in the political 
arena. 
 The last row in Table 7 shows that firms with controversial privatizations 
employed board members in democracy who were 36 percentage points more likely to 
appear in the Panama Papers (p-value 0.02). This difference is large, as more than half of 
controversial firms employed at least one board member who appeared in these 
documents. In contrast, only 18 percent of uncontroversial firms employed a board 
member from the list. We highlight that this is a legal behavior, but it nevertheless 
decreases tax revenues and it is therefore important to study. 
 
Robustness and omitted variables 
 
 A variety of econometric exercises suggest our findings are robust and the effect 
of unobservables is minimal. We begin by showing similar estimates when we include 
additional control variable or exclude particular firms from the estimation. Additionally, 
the effects of controversies are similar, and if anything larger, if we use the processes 
 
17 
studied by Marcel (1989) and Mönckeberg (2001) to define controversial privatizations. 
Finally, we show results are also robust to the use of modern matching estimators and 
techniques that adjust for the effect of unobservables, suggesting omitted variables are 
not driving our results. Table 8 presents all of these additional results. 
 We begin showing robustness to additional controls. Scholars have argued the two 
waves of privatization were different from each other, as the former privatized firms 
nationalized by Salvador Allende, and the latter privatized long-standing state-owned 
firms. To check for this potential confounding factor, we constructed an indicator that 
identifies the “privatization wave” of a firm and included it as an additional control. 
Column 4 shows that the results controlling by wave are similar. Another potential 
confounder could be a change in the controller of a firm, but column 5 shows similar 
results if we eliminate the few firms that changed controllers between 1990 and 2005.
18
 
 A different classification of firms and the exclusion of single firms from 
estimation provide more robustness to the results. First, our clustering algorithm could 
have captured unobservable variables, so it is important to check if results are driven by 
the procedure we chose. Besides using other clustering algorithms, we also classified 
firms as controversial if these were mentioned as “corrupt” by Marcel (1989) or 
Mönckeberg (2001), who argue 8 of our 50 firms were sold underpriced.
19
 Column 7 in 
Table 8 shows results are larger using their classification. Second, we checked if results 
changed when we exclude one firm at the time from the estimation. Results in the Online 
Appendix confirm that our estimates are not driven by single observations. 
 Another threat is the omission of variables that could be correlated with 
controversies and explain the outcomes of interest. Two econometric techniques suggest 
the estimates are robust and the effect of omitted variables is minimal. First, we use 
matching techniques to perform improved comparisons. Operationally, we calculate the 
probability of controversies in a privatization using pre-privatization variables and 
industry fixed effects. Then we perform three estimations, one in which we follow 
Crump, Hotz, Imbens and Mitnik (2009) and restrict the sample to firms that have similar 
probabilities of controversies (Table 8, column 1), another in which we simply control for 
the probability of controversies (column 2), and a last one in which we create a 
counterfactual for each firm using the k-nearest neighbors (column 3).
20
 The second 
strategy uses the predictive power of observable variables to adjust the coefficient of 
interest by considering the effect of unobservables. This “coefficient stability approach” - 
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 Donelli, Larraín and Urzúa (2013) show that changes in control are rather unusual in Chile, with most 
firms having the same controlling shareholder since 1990. 
19
 Hence, we classify these 8 firms as controversial and use the remaining 42 as uncontroversial. 
Importantly, we emphasize that the clustering algorithm indeed classifies these 8 firms as controversial. 
20
 The first matching technique omits six firms from estimation and the second and third techniques drop 
two firms without a counterfactual in the same industry (see the Online Appendix). 
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first proposed by Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) and refined by Oster (2019) - again 
delivers similar estimates (Table 8, column 6). 
 We conclude that the evidence suggests the existence of a preferential treatment 
flowing from the regime to controversial privatizations and these firms operated as 
political corporations in the democracy period. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION 
 
 Are results explained by characteristics of the buyers or by characteristics of the 
firms? Maybe buyers used whatever firm they could buy to channel their economic and 
political objectives. Or maybe firms had some characteristic (e.g., they were politically 
connected before privatization) that made them obtain benefits from Pinochet, grew 
more, and be more political after the return to democracy. 
 This section begins by providing evidence suggesting that both underpricing and 
closeness-to-the-regime appear to be statistically relevant. However, we emphasize that a 
potential causal relationship between these two characteristics makes it difficult to gauge 
their relative contribution. The section ends with a discussion using an econometric 
decomposition of previous estimates. Our conclusion is that the political connections of 
the buyers are more likely to explain our results. 
 
Privatization characteristics 
  
 To estimate the relative importance of privatization characteristics, we use a 
version of equation (3) in which we unbundle controversies: 
 
Yijt = b1 Closenessi + b2 Underpricingi + d Xij + nj + eijt    (4) 
 
where Yijt is one of the economic or political outcomes from previous sections, Xij are 
pre-privatization controls, nj are industry fixed effects, and eijt is a robust error term with 
a mean of zero. The variables that characterize privatizations are closeness-to-the-regime 
and underpricing. When estimating equation (4) our goal is to gauge the relative 
importance of b1 and b2. To accomplish this, we compare the statistical significance and 
magnitude of these estimates. For the former, we simply test if b1 and b2 are statistically 
different from zero. For the latter, we use standardized effects, i.e. we compare the 
response of each outcome to a change of one standard deviation in each of these 
variables. The standard deviation of underpricing is 0.45 and the standard deviation of the 
closeness-to-the-regime variable is 0.27. 
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 Table 9 presents estimation results of b1 (column 1) and b2 (column 2) for all 
outcomes in the paper, the p-value for the hypothesis b1=b2 (column 3), and the p-value 
for the multiple hypothesis b1=0 and b2=0 (column 4). Both privatization characteristics 
are negatively associated with outcomes. When trying to gauge their relative importance, 
however, a mixed picture emerges. On one hand, the coefficient is generally larger in 
magnitude for underpricing. On the other hand, the coefficient associated with closeness-
to-the-regime is a more precise estimate, as we observe more statistically significant 
results at conventional levels for this variable. 
 The main challenge to interpret the similar econometric importance of 
privatization characteristics is the potential causal relationship between them. It is 
plausible that a firm was sold underpriced because the people involved in the sale were 
linked to the Pinochet regime. In particular, there are two possible interpretations. First, 
people involved in an underpriced sale had an arguably tighter connection and this is why 
prices were low. If true, then the characteristics of buyers should be the main explanation 
for our results. Second, there is some characteristic of these firms that made them 
attractive for individuals linked to Pinochet. Are findings explained by people involved in 
the sale or by some firm characteristic? 
 
Politically connected buyers and politically connected firms 
 
 We now examine the relative importance of politically connected buyers versus 
pre-privatization political connectedness of firms. Figure 2 shows that all firms classified 
as controversial were bought by people closed to Pinochet. Board members and buyers 
compose this “closeness-to-the-regime” variable. Table 1 shows that controversial firms 
had significantly more politically connected buyers: 96% versus none. In contrast, the 
share of board members linked to the regime before privatization is similar across firms 
before privatization. To study the relative importance of buyers and firms we omit the 
underpricing variable - which could be contaminated by the buyers and hence be a “bad 
control” - and estimate the following regression: 
 
Yijt = w1 Buyer connectioni + w2 Board connectioni + d Xij + nj + eijt (5) 
 
where Buyer connectioni is an indicator that takes the value of one for firms bought by 
someone linked to Pinochet, and Board connectioni is an indicator that takes the value of 
one for firms with board connections to Pinochet before the corresponding privatization 
process. The latter is our definition of political connections in the previous section and 
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the one used in González and Prem (2019). The remaining variables are defined as 
before. 
 Before presenting estimates, it is useful to provide descriptive statistics and check 
for pre-privatization differences. On one hand, the set of firms bought by connected 
buyers is almost the same than the set of controversial firms. On the other hand, there are 
18 firms with political connections and 32 unconnected firms before privatization. The 
Online Appendix compares pre-privatization characteristics between firms with and 
without politically connected buyers, and between firms with and without political 
connections before privatizations respectively. The comparison in the former is almost 
identical to the one in Table 2. The comparison in the latter reveals that politically 
connected firms had lower leverage and were more likely to have been privatized during 
the 1980s. 
 Table 10 presents estimates of equation (5). When analyzing w1 there are two 
econometric patterns across outcomes. First, the benefits firms obtained during the 
dictatorship period seem to be entirely explained by the political connections of the 
buyers. Notably, their connections are able to explain the decrease in the stock market 
value and the additional loans these firms obtain from the state bank. Second, the 
formation of connections to the new democratic regime and the appearance in the 
Panama Papers is also driven by buyers’ connections: firms with a connected buyer are 
37 percentage points more likely to employ a politician of the new regime towards 2005 
and 34 percentage points more likely to hire board members with money in tax havens. 
 Two patterns emerge from the analysis of w2. In the first place, none of the 
coefficients associated to benefits during the dictatorship is statistically different from 
zero and the point estimates are of small economic magnitude. Firms with political 
connections before privatization are also not more likely to appoint board members who 
appeared in the Panama Papers. In addition, there is a significant persistence in the 
connections to the old regime. In particular, these firms were 39 percentage points more 
likely to be connected to a politician of the old regime in 1995 and this number decreases 
only to 28 percentage points in 2005. This pattern is in stark contrast to the one among 
firms with politically connected buyers. 
 What would have happened if politically connected buyers bought a different set 
of firms? This is a difficult question to answer. Table 10 suggests that buyers would have 
behave similarly in other firms, but it might be the case that unobserved firm 
characteristics explain why buyers bought the firms they bought. Our analysis cannot 
fully rule out characteristics of firms that are unobserved to us as econometricians but 
observed by the buyers of firms. If politically connected buyers were acquiring certain 
firms precisely because they were political in the past, then our findings reveal how 
privatization reforms facilitate the persistence of these firms over time. Because political 
connections prior to the privatization cannot explain our results, the evidence suggests 
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that controversial firms transformed into political corporations. Unfortunately, we cannot 
fully rule out other unobserved political characteristics of firms. 
 Finally, we would like to highlight potential explanations for the behavior of 
connected buyers after the dictatorship period ended. Why were they exerting influence 
in the new democratic period? We believe there are at least two reasons. First, connected 
buyers seemed to have benefited from the dictatorship. If these benefits translated into a 
better position of their firms in the market, then they acquired economic rents that needed 
to be protected. An example would be the acquisition of government contracts during the 
dictatorship that are not guaranteed in the new democratic period. Lobbying could help to 
perpetuate these contracts, making the returns to lobbying potentially higher for 
controversial firms. Second, the political connections of controversial firms can be 
particularly valuable in new democracies that are still under the influence of the previous 
regime. Augusto Pinochet remained a powerful political force in the years after the 
transition, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the Army (1973-1998) and then Senator for 
life (1998-2002). The institutional framework made the cost of exerting influence lower 
for controversial firms, at least until 1998 when Pinochet was detained in London. Both 
of these explanations imply that controversial firms were more likely to make efforts to 
influence politics. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 We have studied the privatization program implemented by the Pinochet 
dictatorship in Chile and found evidence of firms sold to politically connected buyers 
transforming into political corporations operating in democracy. While Pinochet was still 
in power, we found that these firms had higher stock market valuation and had access to 
more loans from state banks. After Pinochet left power, firms sold to connected buyers 
formed dynamic political connections, financed political campaigns, and decreased tax 
revenues by avoiding taxes. These findings are important because they reveal how 
authoritarian regimes can transfer their economic and political power using firms as 
vehicles and affect the functioning of young democracies. 
 These results have at least two implications. First, they suggest that benefits from 
regulating privatization processes may be greater than previously thought. There may be 
significant benefits from policies that increase competition among potential buyers or 
demand minimum requirements to buy state owned firms. Second, our findings suggest 
caution when interpreting the effects of democratizations. Indeed, the functioning of a 
new democracy depends on how and if dictatorships manage to transfer their economic 
and political power across regimes. 
 We believe our findings open new and interesting questions about privatization. 
For example, although we have shown how privatizations implemented in dictatorship 
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can influence politics even after democratization, whether and when these effects will 
disappear are still open questions. Recent scandals in campaign finance in Chile have 
made incumbent politicians design regulations that attempt to decrease the influence of 
firms in politics. 
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TABLE 1 
CHARACTERIZATION OF PRIVATIZATION PROCESSES 
 
 
  Subsample of firms  
  
All 
firms 
With 
controversial 
processes 
Without 
controversial 
processes 
Difference 
(2)-(3) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Share of board with links to regime 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.06 
  (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) [0.16] 
Buyer has links to the regime 0.42 0.96 0.00 0.96*** 
  (0.50) (0.21) (0.00) [0.00] 
Closeness to the regime 0.25 0.54 0.03 0.51*** 
  (0.27) (0.09) (0.06) [0.00] 
Underpricing in privatization 0.08 0.23 -0.03 0.26** 
  (0.45) (0.39) (0.48) [0.04] 
Number of firms 50 22 28   
 
Notes: Averages and standard deviation (in parentheses) in columns 1-3 and p-values for 
a double size t-test in square brackets in column 4. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p 
< 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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TABLE 2 
FIRMS BEFORE PRIVATIZATION 
Difference between (1) and (2) 
  
Firms with 
controversial 
privatizations 
Firms with 
uncontroversial 
privatizations 
Means 
p-
value 
[perm. 
test] 
Distributions 
K-S p-value 
Firms 
without 
privatization 
but with 
reports 
Firms with 
privatization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Logarithm of assets 20.8 23.9 0.10 0.14 16.2 – 
  (1.1) (1.4) [0.10] 
 
(1.3)   
Logarithm of sales 19.0 23.2 0.04 0.12 15.1 – 
  (1.4) (1.4) [0.04] 
 
(1.8)   
Return over equity 0.15 0.19 0.42 0.31 0.38 – 
  (0.05) (0.03) [0.40] 
 
(0.62)   
Leverage 0.42 0.42 0.99 0.96 0.36 – 
  (0.05) (0.05) [0.99] 
 
(0.22)   
∆ Logarithm of assets 0.03 0.01 0.82 0.49 -0.02 – 
  (0.05) (0.06) [0.81] 
 
(0.24)   
∆ Logarithm of sales 0.05 0.07 0.89 0.69 0.01 – 
  (0.10) (0.12) [0.89] 
 
(0.40)   
∆ Return over equity 0.03 -0.14 0.46 0.85 -0.34 – 
  (0.17) (0.14) [0.44] 
 
(0.63)   
∆ Leverage 0.08 0.10 0.86 0.40 0.29 – 
  (0.06) (0.05) [0.87] 
 
(0.77)   
Tobin’s q† 0.58 0.57 0.93 0.86 – – 
  (0.08) (0.06) [0.94] 
  
  
Years since established 40 49 0.36 0.83 31 – 
  (5) (7) [0.39] 
 
(21)   
Year of privatization 1983 1981 0.09 0.22 – 1979 
  (1) (1) [0.10]     (5) 
 Number of firms 22 28 
 
  25 188 
Notes: Are there observable differences between firms with controversial and uncontroversial privatization 
processes before privatization? This table provides evidence by presenting averages of variables in the 
reports before the year each firm was privatized. Column 3 presents the p-value for differences in means 
across groups in columns 1 and 2. Column 4 compares distributions in columns 1 and 2 and presents the p-
value from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test (Kolmogorov, 1933; Smirnov, 1933). For reference, 
column 5 presents descriptive statistics for firms that were not privatized and have annual reports; we use 
the average privatization year in the firm’s industry. Column 6 presents the privatization year for firms 
without reports. We present standard deviations in parenthesis and p-values with and without correction for 
inference in small sample.†Sub-sample of 41 firms. More details in the data and results sections. 
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TABLE 3 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVATIZATION CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Notes: What pre-privatization variables predict privatization characteristics? This table 
presents estimates from cross-sectional regressions using privatization characteristics as 
dependent variable - i.e. underpricing or closeness to the regime - and pre-privatization 
variables as predictors. More details in the data section. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
  
Dependent 
variable 
Underpriced (average of 0.08) 
Closeness-to-the-regime 
(average of 0.25) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Logarithm of 
assets 
0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Logarithm of 
sales 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.16 -0.08 -0.21 -0.27 
  (0.20) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) 
Return over 
equity 
-0.06 0.06 0.19 0.27 -0.06 -0.21 -0.16 
  (0.20) (0.33) (0.33) (0.36) (0.18) (0.23) (0.23) 
1980s 
privatization 
wave 
  
0.67** 0.57** 
  
0.21 
  
  
(0.30) (0.26) 
  
(0.23) 
Closeness-to-
the-regime    
0.46*  
  
  
  
   
(0.24) 
  
  
Number of 
firms 
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.02 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.15 0.22 0.25 
Industry 
fixed effects 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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TABLE 4 
THE STOCK MARKET 
Days after the plebiscite: 1 day 3 days 5 days 8 days 10 days 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: without controls 
    
  
  
 
     
Controversial 
privatization 
-0.08*** -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.06* -0.06* 
   (0.03)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 0.03 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.08] [0.09] 
Number of firms 41 41 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.08 
Pre-privatization controls 
(Xi) 
No No No No No 
Industry fixed effects (η j) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: with controls 
    
  
  
    
  
Controversial 
privatization 
-0.07** -0.05** -0.07** -0.04 -0.03 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
  [0.03] [0.04] [0.05] [0.33] [0.38] 
Number of firms 41 41 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.16 0.15 
Pre-privatization controls 
(Xi) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects (η j) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Does the value of firms with controversial privatization processes changes after 
the unexpected announcement of Chile’s transition to democracy in October 5th of 1988? 
Each column in this table provides evidence by presenting OLS estimates equation (2) in 
the paper. We collected data on stock prices from newspaper El Mercurio. Our sample 
decreases from 50 to 41 firms because in order to calculate abnormal returns
 
we need to 
observe stock prices four months before the event we study, and we do not observe these 
for 9 firms. More details in the results section. Robust standard errors in parentheses and 
p-values correcting for small sample inference in square brackets. Significance level: *** 
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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TABLE 5 
THE CREDIT MARKET 
 
Banco 
del 
Estado 
Private 
Banks  
International 
Banks 
Banco 
del 
Estado 
Private 
Banks 
International 
Banks 
Leverage 
Log total 
debt 
Panel A: years 1988–1990 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
       
  
Controversial 
privatization 
0.30** -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 1.55*** 
 
(0.14) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.42) 
 
[0.05] [0.89] [0.68] [0.04] [0.57] [0.30] [0.96] [0.00] 
Number of firms 50 50 50 12 33 32 50 50 
R-squared 0.44 0.19 0.22 0.38 0.01 0.04 0.47 0.39 
Pre-privatization controls 
(Xi) 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects (η j) Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Avg. uncontroversial 
privatizations 
0.19 0.96 0.93 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.33 16.41 
Avg. firms without 
privatization 
0.08 0.87 0.87 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.36 14.50 
Panel B: years 1986–1987 
      
  
       
  
Controversial 
privatization 
0.14 0.03 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 1.34*** 
 
(0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.44) 
 
[0.30] [0.76] [0.26] [0.78] [0.71] [0.46] [0.90] [0.01] 
Number of firms 50 50 50 10 32 33 50 50 
R-squared 0.57 0.49 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.64 0.42 
Pre-privatization controls 
(Xi) 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects (η j) Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Avg. uncontroversial 
privatizations 
0.11 0.93 0.89 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.41 16.5 
Avg. firms without 
privatization 
0.10 0.82 0.82 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.46 14.62 
Notes: Each column presents estimates of equation (3) where we measure the dependent 
variable
 
in1988-1990 (Panel A) or in 1986-1987 (Panel B). Dependent variables 
measuring loans, interest rates, and leverage (debt over assets) are own construction from 
firm-level reports. Banco del Estado is the main state owned bank in Chile. More details 
in the results section. Robust standard errors in parentheses and p-values correcting for 
small sample inference in square brackets. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1.  
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TABLE 6 
THE BEGINNING OF DEMOCRACY 
  
Logarithm 
assets 
Logarithm 
sales 
Leverage 
Return over 
equity 
Stock returns since 
year of 
privatization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Controversial privatization 1.62*** 0.92 0.04 0.01 -0.11 
  (0.35) (0.67) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) 
  [0.00] [0.20] [0.57] [0.93] [0.34] 
Number of firms 50 50 50 50 43 
R-squared 0.48 0.44 0.45 0.34 0.58 
Pre-privatization controls (Xi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects (η j) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Avg. uncontroversial privatizations 17.77 17.21 0.32 0.16 0.23 
Avg. firms without privatization 16.36 15.56 0.33 0.42 0.43 
Notes: Each column in this table presents estimates of equation (3) with outcomes at the 
beginning of democracy, i.e. at the end of year 1990. More details in the results section. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and p-values correcting for small sample inference 
in square brackets. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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TABLE 7 
POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY 
 
Coefficient 
controversial 
privatization (β) 
p-value 
permutation 
test 
Average 
uncontroversial 
privatizations 
R-squared 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
   
Employed any politician in 1995 0.25* [0.08] 0.18 0.25 
 
 (0.14) 
   Employed any politician in 2000 0.28*  [0.08] 0.32 0.29 
 (0.15)    
Employed any politician in 2005 0.27 [0.10] 0.26 0.24 
 (0.18)    
Employed politician of the old regime in 1995 0.25* [0.07] 0.14 0.33 
 
 (0.14) 
   Employed politician of the old regime in 2000 0.23 [0.13] 0.25 0.27 
 (0.15)    
Employed politician of the old regime in 2005 -0.09 [0.53] 0.22 0.29 
 (0.13)    
Employed politician of the new regime in 1995 -0.02 [0.79] 0.07 0.05 
 (0.06)    
Employed politician of the new regime in 2000 0.09 [0.38] 0.11 0.17 
 (0.11)    
Employed politician of the new regime in 2005 0.40***  [0.00] 0.07 0.33 
 
(0.15) 
   Legal campaign finance 0.31**  [0.05] 0.36 0.37 
 (0.15)    
Illegal campaign finance 0.18 [0.17] 0.18 0.21 
 (0.14)    
Appeared in the Panama Papers 0.36**  [0.02] 0.18 0.28 
 
(0.15)    
Number of firms 50    
Pre-privatization controls (Xi) Yes    
Industry fixed effects (η j) Yes    
Notes: Each row in this table presents estimates of equation (3). The “old regime” 
corresponds to the Pinochet regime (1973–1990) and the “new regime” corresponds to 
the period after 1990. More details in the results section. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses and p-values correcting for small sample inference in square brackets. 
Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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TABLE 8 
ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS AND OMITTED VARIABLES 
 
Notes: Each estimate comes from a different estimation strategy. See the results section 
for details. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 
0.05, * p < 0.1.  
  
Truncate 
matching 
(Crump et 
al. 2009) 
Matching 
controls 
pscore 
controversial 
Matching 
using k-
nearest 
neighbor 
Adds 
control for 
privatization 
wave 
Drops 
firms with 
takeovers 
Coefficient 
stability 
(Oster 
2017) 
Journalistic 
investig. 
(Mönckeberg 
2001) 
Dictatorship (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
      
  
Cumulative abnormal returns 
(5 days) 
-0.10*** -0.08** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.03 -0.07* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
Indicator for loans with state 
bank 
0.29** 0.31** 0.50*** 0.31** 0.14 0.16 0.46** 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) 
 
(0.17) 
Leverage 0.01 0.01 0.16* 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.06 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) 
 
(0.05) 
Democracy 
      
  
  
      
  
Employed any politician 1995 0.29** 0.27** 0.10 0.26* 0.27** 0.60 0.53** 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.26) (0.14) (0.13) 
 
(0.23) 
Employed any politician 2005 0.28 0.26* 0.40*** 0.27 0.23 0.40 0.40* 
  (0.17) (0.15) (0.12) (0.18) (0.23) 
 
(0.23) 
Employed politician of old 
regime 1995 
0.29** 0.28** 0.30** 0.26* 0.23* 0.50 0.41* 
  (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) 
 
(0.21) 
Employed politician of old 
regime 2005 
-0.09 -0.09 0.05 -0.08 -0.11 -0.14 -0.02 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.20) 
 
(0.13) 
Employed politician of new 
regime 1995 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.20 -0.03 0.02 0.09 0.09 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.21) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
(0.17) 
Employed politician of new 
regime 2005 
0.41*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.41** 0.70 0.52** 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) 
 
(0.21) 
Legal campaign finance 0.32** 0.33** 0.35* 0.29* 0.37** 0.46 0.35* 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.15) (0.17) 
 
(0.19) 
Illegal campaign finance 0.16 0.19 -0.05 0.14 -0.01 0.51 0.51*** 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) 
 
(0.18) 
Appeared in the Panama 
Papers 
0.34** 0.33** 0.20 0.33** 0.29 0.67 0.50** 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.19) 
 
(0.21) 
Number of firms 44 48 48 50 43 50 50 
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TABLE 9 
UNBUNDLING THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATIZATION CHARACTERISTICS 
 
  
Closeness to 
the regime 
Underpricing 
in sale 
p-value (1) = 
(2) 
p-value (1)=0 
& (2)=0 
Dictatorship (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
   
  
Cumulative abnormal returns (5 days) -0.03** -0.03 0.86 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.02) 
 
  
Indicator for loans with state bank 0.12 0.11 0.95 0.03 
  (0.08) (0.08) 
 
  
Average interest rate with state bank -0.01 -0.02 0.87 0.09 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
 
  
Leverage 0.00 0.01 0.73 0.92 
  (0.02) (0.03) 
 
  
Democracy 
   
  
  
   
  
Employed any politician 1995 0.09 0.17* 0.51 0.05 
  (0.07) (0.09) 
 
  
Employed any politician 2005 0.14 -0.04 0.24 0.26 
  (0.08) (0.11) 
 
  
Employed politician of old regime 
1995 
0.08 0.15* 0.58 0.04 
  (0.07) (0.08) 
 
  
Employed politician of old regime 
2005 
-0.02 -0.05 0.83 0.81 
  (0.07) (0.09) 
 
  
Employed politician of new regime 
1995 
-0.02 0.06 0.26 0.53 
  (0.03) (0.06) 
 
  
Employed politician of new regime 
2005 
0.17 0.07 0.36 0.02 
  (0.07) (0.07) 
 
  
Legal campaign finance 0.15** 0.02 0.31 0.11 
  (0.07) (0.10) 
 
  
Illegal campaign finance 0.12* -0.07 0.12 0.20 
  (0.07) (0.09) 
 
  
Appeared in the Panama Papers 0.15* 0.05 0.41 0.11 
  (0.08) (0.07)     
Notes: Each row in this table presents two OLS estimates from a single regression that 
includes pre-privatization controls and industry fixed effects. See the discussion section 
for details. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 
0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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TABLE 10 
THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICALLY CONNECTED BUYERS 
 
Politically 
connected buyers 
during 
privatization 
Politically 
connected 
firm before 
privatization 
p-value 
(1)=(2) 
p-value 
(1)=0 & 
(2)=0 
Dictatorship (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Cumulative abnormal returns (5 
days) 
-0.10*** 0.00 0.05 0.01 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
  
Indicator for loans with state bank 0.32** -0.03 0.10 0.08 
 
(0.14) (0.17) 
  
Average interest rate with state 
bank 
-0.04**  0.00  0.14 0.30 
 
(0.03) (0.01) 
  Leverage 0.01 -0.04 0.61 0.86 
 
(0.05) (0.07) 
  
Democracy 
    
     
Employed any politician 1995 0.09 0.48*** 0.07 0.01 
 
(0.12) (0.16) 
  
Employed any politician 2005 0.19 0.16 0.92 0.27 
 
(0.19) (0.19) 
  
Employed politician of old regime 
1995 
0.10 0.44*** 0.05 0.01 
 
(0.11) (0.14) 
  
Employed politician of old regime 
2005 
-0.15 0.25 0.05 0.15 
 
(0.12) (0.15) 
  
Employed politician of new 
regime 1995 
-0.03 0.02 0.79 0.94 
 
(0.08) (0.10) 
  
Employed politician of new 
regime 2005 
0.37** -0.06 0.10 0.07 
 
(0.16) (0.16) 
  
Legal campaign finance 0.26* 0.21 0.85 0.10 
 
(0.14) (0.17) 
  
Illegal campaign finance 0.20 0.10 0.66 0.30 
 
(0.14) (0.18) 
  
Appeared in the Panama Papers 0.34*** -0.08 0.08 0.10 
 
(0.16) (0.17) 
  
Notes: Each row in this table presents two OLS estimates from a single regression that 
includes pre-privatization controls and industry fixed effects. See the discussion section 
for details. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 
0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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FIGURE 1 
PRIVATIZATIONS BY YEAR 
 
(a) All firms privatized by the Pinochet regime      (b) Our data of privatized firms 
 
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of privatizations by year during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-
1990). Panel (a) shows all privatizations implemented by the regime as presented in Congress Report 
(2004). Panel (b) shows the distribution of privatizations in our dataset. 
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FIGURE 2 
DETECTING CONTROVERSIAL PRIVATIZATION PROCESSES 
 
(a) k-means clustering algorithm 
 
(b) Spectral clustering   (c) Agglomeration clustering 
 
Notes: We classify firms using different clustering algorithms. See the data section for details. 
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Figure 3 
THE STOCK MARKET 
 
(a) Announcement of transition 
 
(b) Pinochet gets nominated     (c) Constitutional reform 
 
(d) 1989 Presidential Election    (e) New government takes office 
 
Notes: Own construction using stock price data hand-collected from contemporary newspaper El Mercurio, 
available at Chile's National Library. See the results section for details. 
 
